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Abstract:  
In their key works, W. Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Carl Menger (1840-1921) 
introduce crucial behavioral assumptions as these relate to individual and 
aggregate economic activity. The assumptions found in Jevons’ work primarily 
focus on the ‘Pain and Pleasure Principle’, originally established by Jeremy 
Bentham, and how the human characteristic of inevitable variability interacts with 
basic needs. Subsequently, Menger’s contribution is centered on the idea that the 
value of a good is inherently subjective and also dependent upon human 
variability. This inquiry, therefore, seeks to establish that Jevons’ and Menger’s 
behavioral assumptions led to their being classified as early ‘behavioral’ 
economists. Expanding outwards, the field of ‘Behavioral Economics’ can be 
described through the use of a commonly assigned utility function that is familiar 
in the standard economic analysis of a rational individual – while correcting for 
inevitable variations in human behavior. Upon careful consideration, it can be 
determined that Jevons and Menger share many similar ideas and approaches with 
modern behavioral economists.  
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In their key works, W. Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Carl Menger (1840-1921) 
introduce crucial behavioral assumptions as they relate to economic activity. This 
inquiry seeks to establish that Jevons’ and Menger’s behavioral assumptions 
classify them as behavioral economists. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics (2008, 433-434), Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume teach us that 
behavioral economics can be described as using the same utility function that is 
familiar in the standard economic analysis of a rational individual while correcting 
for the inevitable variation in human behavior. Additionally, behavioral economists 
seek to question the axioms and assumptions posited in standard economic analysis 
with the eventual goal of creating a more reflective set of standards by which we 
base further analyses. Although both Jevons and Menger contributed to the 
advancement of economics long before the consideration and development of 
behavioral economics, the question of whether or not they were engaging in 
practices similar to those of modern behavioral economists begs being asked. 
Certainly, both scholars were interested in developing economic theories as they 
relate to satisfying man’s first need: pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. 
 
Assumptions Advanced by Jevons 
In his The Theory of Political Economy [1871], W. Stanley Jevons (1957, 28-29) 




Principle as a basis for furthering his ideas. Essentially, an individual’s primary 
motivation for their actions is to seek pleasure and avoid pain.  This practice by 
Jevons naturally allows the reader to begin drawing parallels between him and 
modern behavioral economists. Jevons ponders human behavior rather extensively 
in the first few chapters, questioning how pain and pleasure interact in man, the 
rationale of a man who looks to the future versus a man (or “savage”) who merely 
lives in the present moment, and what a man has a tendency to do once the 
necessary needs in his life are met (a concept very much reminiscent of Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs Theory, which emerged in 1943). More specifically, Jevons 
(1957, 29) introduces the idea that any feeling, whether it be pain or pleasure, 
consists of two dimensions: duration and intensity. If this can be accepted, Jevons 
then furthers the idea in claiming that the intensity of a feeling is in a constant state 
of variation, much like the incessant variation that generally characterizes the 
human mind. This can be represented by a downwards sloping curve, as the curve 
shape represents the idea that the change is constant, and the level of intensity 
virtually never settles on a particular value. From the beginning, the reader may 
begin to decipher that Jevons is establishing a constant variation or an 
unpredictable quality as a fundamental consideration when discussing the 
consequences of human thought and behavior—the byproduct, of course, being 




 Furthermore, Jevons begins expanding his ideas on a particular circumstance 
of pain and pleasure established by Bentham: the role that propinquity or 
remoteness plays in the force of the interaction with pain and pleasure. 
Specifically, Jevons (1957, 33) establishes the idea of anticipated feeling—the idea 
that the anticipation of a certain event that will bring pleasure (or pain) impacts our 
current pleasure with respect to that event. In fact, there are two dimensions at 
work in an anticipated feeling: the amount anticipated to be felt in the future and 
the amount of time that will pass until that future event. Here, Jevons is making a 
powerful statement about the state of human rationale at any given moment as a 
function of not only the pleasure that a person is currently feeling but any action a 
person can take or event they can participate in in any point in the future as long as 
such an action or event promises them future pleasure. This assumption has large 
implications for individual economic activity and consequently for the 
participation in the economic markets of a society. For example, Jevons (1957, 35) 
posits that this driving mechanism of human behavior provides the primary 
rationale for industry and saving as well as for the accumulation of stocks of 
commodity. If a man has the particular foresight to consider his future happiness, 
he is driven to participate in the accumulation of stocks and in savings so that he 
may secure his future happiness, which in turn increases his current state of 




every moment of exertion tends to realise his aspirations.” Certainly, it is not 
difficult to accept that this particular aspect of human behavior plays a large role in 
individual economic activity: in fact, several aspects of the market are based in and 
rely on this crucial aspect of human rationale. 
 Jevons begins his last collection of ideas about the variation of utility with a 
final crucial assumption: the laws of the aggregate depend on and are determined 
by the laws of the individual. While Jevons (1957, 48) mentions this idea 
passingly, he identifies it as being one that is foundational to the next several 
sections in which he discusses the variation of utility at length. This assumption, 
while at first glance is seemingly unthreatening, takes on an entirely new meaning 
when entertained through a behavioral economics lens. If we accept that there are 
large amounts of variation in human behavior, even within the scope of one 
individual’s behavior, is the assumption that we can create aggregate models based 
on the laws of the individual the best foundation for a further set of ideas and 
projections? Certainly, Jevons has considered this and decided that as long as we 
accept the variation in individual behavior, we will accept that any models of the 
aggregate based off individuals will almost certainly exhibit this variation as well. 
In fact, Jevons (1957, 48) claims that the only way that we can effectively observe 




patterns of the aggregate as it relates to economic market activity, consumption, 
and production exhibited by a large body of people.  
 
Assumptions Advanced by Menger 
In 1871, the same year as Jevons’ Theory was published, Carl Menger would also 
publish his first key work, Principles of Economics [1871]. Despite the two having 
never exchanged ideas on the matter, their thoughts would prove to be strikingly 
similar in content. Menger begins the third chapter of Principles by discussing a 
theory of value with the resounding main precedent being that value is not inherent 
in a good—it is only a consequence of man having assigned a value to it based on 
its quality to satisfy a need. Additionally, Menger (1981, 119) discusses such 
topics as the difference between value and utility and what distinguishes a non-
economic good from a “good subject to the quantitative relationship responsible 
for economic character.” As he concludes this section of the chapter focusing on 
the nature of value, he introduces a few key concepts, beginning with imaginary 
value. According to Menger (1981, 120), imaginary value is the result of an 
individual incorrectly assigning value to a good that does not, in fact, have value in 
regard to economic activity or consideration. He goes as far as to posit that “men 
can be in error about the value of goods just as they can be in error with respect to 




the assumption that man is inherently flawed and variable. In fact, he may even be 
inconsistent to the point of not being able to recognize when he is receiving 
satisfaction from a good. 
 Along the same lines, Menger continues his assertions pertaining to the 
variability of man in his further discussion of the inherent value of a good. As 
mentioned previously, Menger was forthright in his claim that a good has neither 
inherent use value nor exchange value. In fact, Menger (1981, 118) claims this 
assumption to be a flaw of arguments previously made by other contributors to the 
subject. As it relates to his later assumptions, Menger (1981, 120) maintains that 
because a good has neither use value nor exchange value, it has no value at all until 
it is framed in terms of how the good may satisfy a particular need of man. For 
example, if a group of people find themselves on an island with a sustainable 
source of drinking water, the water has no value to the people because no person 
may want for water and would therefore not be willing or required to consider 
what would need to be exchanged or given up to obtain water. But, if the 
circumstances of the island change so that either the supply of water were to 
decrease to a point where the share of water must be divided, or if the number of 
people were to increase to a similar point, the water would then obtain value for 
every individual—because the water is not abundant enough to sufficiently supply 




demand, the water is valuable and may be considered in terms of use value or 
exchange value.  
 The apex, then, of Menger’s views on use value and exchange value rest on 
humans and their interactions with goods. The reader may make no mistake 
regarding his idea that there is nothing objective in determining a good’s value—
he very clearly states in several instances in the third chapter that a good has no 
inherent value, and the only circumstance that can bestow value on a good is one in 
which the good serves to satisfy the need of an individual or can bring the 
individual a sense of well-being. In addition, as was mentioned previously, Menger 
accepts and acknowledges the innate variability in human consciousness, making it 
clear that this assumption carries throughout the remainder of his models and other 
claims. It can therefore be inferred from these two assumptions that the value of a 
good is entirely subjective—existing at the whim of the everchanging needs of the 
individual—an idea that Menger consistently hints at as he establishes other 
claims. Indeed, this creates a disconnect in terms of consistently measuring the 
value of a good, a disconnect which Menger is acutely aware of in previous works 
contributing to the subject. Menger (1981, 121) therefore concludes the first 
section of his third chapter of Principles accordingly: “Objectification of the value 
of goods, which is entirely subjective in nature, has nevertheless contributed very 




Jevons and Menger as Behavioral Economists 
At its core, behavioral economics attempts to consider standard economic models 
while correcting for the inevitable variability in human behavior. Therefore, 
behavioral economists may attempt to challenge certain axioms and assumptions 
concerning behavior by specifically targeting these assumptions in carefully 
designed research experiments. For this reason, it can be difficult to compare the 
work of Jevons and Menger to that of more recent behavioral economists. Both 
scholars published their respective works in a time immediately before the 
mathematization of economics became a widely accepted practice. During this 
time, it was not necessarily expected of a scholar that he or she should provide 
hard, scientific evidence of their claims before publishing them. Economics was 
still riding the line between being a philosophical study and emerging as a field of 
hard science that required definitive research results before making an assumption 
upon which following claims would be based. Therefore, even though many of the 
assertions made by modern behavioral economists rely on using experimental 
evidence to refute the claims of standard economic analysis, it is unreasonable to 
expect that Jevons and Menger be held to the same standard in regard to the 
question of whether or not they may be considered behavioral economists. 




economists will be considered and compared to the practices of Jevons and 
Menger. 
 The first characteristic being considered is that of behavioral economists to, 
according to Durlauf and Blume (2008, 435), “[explore] alternative formulations of 
economic consequences to identify preference-relevant considerations that are 
ignored in standard economic analysis.” Consider Menger’s second assumption 
explored here that use value and exchange value do not inherently exist—the value 
only arises out of an individual’s need for that good. Menger’s stake to this claim 
relies on the fact that previous thinkers had based their theories of value on an 
inherent value of a good that he asserts does not exist due to the fact that value 
only exists in the consciousness of men. It may be argued, then, that Menger 
challenged previously established economic models of value with a “preference-
relevant consideration”: while previous economic models did not necessarily base 
their claims on the preferences of individuals, Menger made a very concerted effort 
to do so. Additionally, we may consider Menger’s related third claim: that the 
value of a good is therefore entirely subjective as it is determined by the varying 
needs of individuals. Menger was unique in making such a bold claim following 
the ideas of his predecessors. By his reasoning, the preferences of individuals and 
the value of a good are interdependent, an idea that places much more emphasis on 




 Secondly, behavioral economists aim to create a larger focus on the way that 
gains and losses are differentially treated. In particular, Durlauf and Blume (2008, 
436) detail the efforts of economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to 
create economic situations using the frame of the actual situation that the 
individual is likely to face, most particularly considering gains and losses in 
relation to the “status quo.” In this instance, we consider Jevons’ first and most 
crucial assumption: that humans are operating according to the fundamental Pain 
and Pleasure Principle. Certainly, we know that Jevons placed tremendous 
importance on pleasure and pain (i.e. gains and losses), as it was explicitly stated 
as the basis on which the remainder of his ideas would rest. Additionally, the 
conditions on which he is operating, originally defined by Jeremy Bentham and 
one of which is considered above, are comparable to creating a frame for the 
situations that individually are most realistically likely to face. The conditions (i.e. 
propinquity and remoteness, in addition to others) are an essential component of 
the original Pain and Pleasure Principle and are concerned with the pragmatic ways 
in which an individual is likely to experience the different situations of pursuing 
pleasure and avoiding pain.  
 The third characteristic being considered is that of behavioral economists to 
create strategic concepts and equilibria that integrate the idea of a decision-maker 




(2008, 436-437), originates with an experiment conducted by Strotz in 1955 and is 
followed by a proposal by Peleg and Yaari in 1973 to create such concepts and 
equilibria. Again, we consider the latter part of Jevons’ first assumption that the 
intensity of a feeling is in a constant state of variation and may be described using 
a downwards sloping curve. The curve model, rather than a model using distinct 
levels that occur at regular intervals, represents the fact that a feeling may never 
actually settle on a particular level for any significant amount of time. Because this 
model is used to describe the behavior of a single person whose intensity of feeling 
is in a constant state of change, it may be said that Jevons is painting the picture of 
the “many inconsistent selves” that exist within each individual, with each self 
only existing for a small fraction of time. Additionally, we consider Jevons’ related 
third assumption that if one accepts the variation in human behavior, enough so as 
to accept the downward sloping curve as a representation of it, one may also 
consider that a model of the aggregate will exhibit this same level of variation as 
the model of the aggregate is based off the model of the individual. In this same 
vein, Jevons is considering how one might take the assumptions that apply to the 
individual and applying them to the assumptions of the aggregate in order to create 
a reflective and accurate set of concepts and equilibria in a similar fashion to the 




 The fourth and final characteristic of behavioral economists that we may 
consider is, as stated by Durlauf and Blume (2008, 437), that if “payoffs are 
‘intrinsically’ dependent on beliefs and beliefs are determined in equilibrium, then 
types cannot be defined independently of the particular equilibrium outcome,” 
where “type” is a termed used in this particular context to describe a mechanism 
which is meant to aid analysis of outcomes given a player’s information as it 
relates to a problem. This idea was originally set forth by Harsanyi in 1967, who 
introduced the notion of types, and was later observed by Geanakoplos, Pearce, 
and Stacchetti in 1989. The essential idea to be gleaned from this observation can 
be summarized in an even more succinct way: equilibrium influences our beliefs 
and our beliefs determine our payoffs. Incidentally, both Jevons and Menger posit 
assumptions relating to the individual’s beliefs and how those beliefs influence 
outcomes or payoffs. First, Jevons’ ideas on anticipated feeling are an obvious 
commentary on the way that an individual’s beliefs influence their outcomes. 
Primarily, Jevons outlines the importance of this concept in regard to the success 
of savings and accumulation of stocks. In this situation, the benefits that an 
individual receives as a result of savings and accumulation of stocks is a direct 
result of their belief that they will receive said benefits. Secondly, Menger’s idea 
on imaginary value again deals largely with an individual’s beliefs, although in this 




applications of this idea, he is explicit in concluding that individuals are not perfect 
and can therefore attribute value where no value exists. Similar to Harsanyi, 
Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, both Jevons and Menger rely on the fact that 
beliefs, in one way or another, influence payoffs and outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
This inquiry has sought to establish that the behavioral assumptions introduced by 
W. Stanley Jevons and Carl Menger classify them as behavioral economists. In 
their key works, Jevons and Menger introduce and expound upon crucial 
behavioral assumptions as they relate to individual and aggregate economic 
activity. Although their respective works were published and considered long 
before the emergence of behavioral economics, there are distinct similarities 
between the assumptions that defined Jevons’ and Menger’s crucial works and 
many of the ideas presented by modern behavioral economists that have so far had 
a substantial impact on this new take on classical economic analysis. After careful 
consideration of the ideas and practices in both realms discussed here, it may be 
reasonably concluded that Jevons and Menger can be considered to have been two 
of the earliest behavioral economists. Both scholars operated under assumptions 
that considered preference-related activity which previous models did not, had a 




the individual consisting of many selves, and defined certain consumer activity 
based solely in the individual’s beliefs. Certainly, we can see how human behavior 
and rationale has continued to fascinate economists over hundreds of years of 
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